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Abstract
This paper examines the compliance behaviour of a taxpayer endowed with a stochastic income,
taking into account dynamical factors as public and private investments, within a stochastic control
framework. Assuming logarithmic utilities and thanks to a suitable rewrite of the problem, we
provide an existence and uniqueness result for the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
associated to the control problem, and we rely on a symbolic and numerical algorithm to study its
solution. Moreover, we implement a Monte Carlo simulation in order to determine an estimate of
the mean and the variance of the total declared income together with a confidence interval. To
illustrate how the method works, we present a computational example where we assign values to the
parameters. In this case we perform a sensitivity analysis, showing how the total declared income
is affected by public and private investments, probability of being discovered, fine, tax rate and
income uncertainty.
Keywords: Tax evasion, Stochastic income, Stochastic control, HJB equation.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyse a stochastic control model on taxpayer’s expectations (or,
in an alternative interpretation, forecasting the taxpayer’s behaviour), taking into
account the presence of public and private investments.
The theoretical literature on tax evasion offers the seminal paper of Allingham
and Sandmo (1972). They treat the choice of evading as a gamble, in which the
discovered evader has to pay taxes on the concealed income at a penalty rate that
is higher than the tax rate. In this framework, the taxpayer chooses the declared
income in order to maximize her expected (with respect to the probability of being
discovered) utility. Yitzhaki (1974) considers a model where the fine is imposed on
the evaded tax, rather than on the evaded income as in the Allingham and Sandmo’s
model. Assuming that the taxpayer has an absolute risk aversion which decreases
with income, he concludes that as the tax rate increases the income evaded decreases.
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As Allingham and Sandmo noticed, tax evasion problem “is related to the analysis
of optimal portfolio and insurance policies in the economics of uncertainty”. The
idea is that the compliance/evasion decision can be seen as analogous to the port-
folio choice with two assets, one safe and one risky. The income evaded can be
regarded as the investment in the risky asset, due to the risky prospect of detection
and punishment. The so called portfolio approach gave rise to a large number of
contributions to the literature (see Cowell 1990; Sandmo 2005 for a comprehensive
survey of the literature) which extended the original model in a number of directions.
However in the literature appeared papers reporting empirical evidences in contrast
with the findings of the classical Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki papers. First of all,
experimental evidence suggests a positive relationship between evasion and the tax
rate (the so called Yitzhaki puzzle). Moreover, the classical model seems unable to
explain the rate of tax compliance documented in many countries. For instance ex-
perimental literature suggests that there are people who never evade, even when the
probability of detection is zero. To reconcile theory with evidence researchers have
recognized that tax evasion have also non-pecuniary determinants that make evasion
different from a gamble. Among the possible determinants, researchers report the
individual morality, stigma, ethical norms (see Gordon 1989; Bordignon 1993; Erard
and Fenstein 1994; Andreoni et al. 1998 among others). Other authors argue that
social interactions may also be important to explain tax behaviors, by relying on the
instruments of game theory (Torgler 2003; O’Doherty 2014).
Then, it has been developed a recent body of literature that extends the portfolio
approach to tax evasion from a static to a (deterministic or stochastic) continuous-
time control framework. In particular, see the work of Lin and Yang (2001) (with
the comment of Dzhumashev and Gahramanov 2011) on tax evasion and stochastic
growth, the paper of Chen (2003) on deterministic growth with public capital, the
work of Dzhumashev (2007) on stochastic growth with corruption, the paper of
Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2008) on stochastic growth with public capital, the
work of Cerqueti and Coppier (2011) on stochastic growth with public capital and
a game-theoretical approach for tax evasion and corruption (see also Cerqueti and
Coppier 2014), the paper of Levaggi and Menoncin (2013) with various possible
choices for the utility function and the penalty form, the work of Ce´lime`ne et al.
(2016) on stochastic growth with corruption in an open economy.
In this paper we analyse the compliance behaviour of a taxpayer endowed with
a stochastic income, taking into account the presence of public and private invest-
ments. In particular, we are interested in studying the taxpayer compliance in a
short time interval (for example one or few years), where the parameters of the tax
system are assumed to be constant. Our model differs in various aspects from the
stochastic control literature on tax evasion. In fact, we model the taxpayer’s income
as a diffusion process, which is not derived by the enforcement mechanism (as in Lin
and Yang 2001; Dzhumashev and Gahramanov 2011). In our model the audit proba-
bility and the fine are considered in the objective functional. Rather than study the
implications of tax evasion on the economic growth, we are interested in providing
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a model able to analyze the compliance behaviour of a single taxpayer. Finally, we
analyze a finite time horizon control problem, whereas Lin and Yang (2001), Levaggi
and Menoncin (2013) study an infinite time horizon problem.
We model the taxpayer’s income as a diffusion process depending on both public
and private investments. Indeed, a part of the collective tax revenue is invested by
the public authorities and it raises the future income of the taxpayer, who is more
motivated to tax compliance (indirect effect). Furthermore, a part of the taxpayer’s
effective income is invested by herself, and it raises her future income (direct effect).
The taxpayer’s problem is to select the compliance policy that maximizes (in a finite
time-interval) her expected well-being, sum of the utility of income and the ‘confi-
dence’ function. The confidence function expresses the social responsibility of the
taxpayer and her confidence in institutions. It depends, as well as on the declared
income, on the tax rate and on the public expenditure effectiveness (see Sparta` 2015
for an exhaustive introduction to this concept).
The Markovian structure of the problem allows us to use the dynamic program-
ming approach. In case of logarithmic utilities and thanks to a suitable rewrite of
the problem, we provide an existence and uniqueness result for the solution of the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB), and a verification theorem showing the
relationship between the solution of the HJB equation and the value function of the
control problem. The HJB equation takes the form of a partial differential equation
which we are not able to explicitly solve. Thus we rely on a symbolic and numerical
algorithm to study the HJB equation, that allow us also to provide a graphical rep-
resentation of the value function. Moreover, we implement a Monte Carlo simulation
in order to determine an estimate of the mean and the variance of the total declared
income, together with a confidence interval. To illustrate how the method works, we
present a computational example where we assign values to the parameters. We also
present a sensitivity analysis, showing how the total declared income is affected by
public and private investments, probability of being discovered, fine, tax rate and
income uncertainty.
In Section 2, the general model is presented. In Section 3, a paradox on risk
neutrality is formalized and solved. Section 4 deals with a class of models for which
we study (by means of a transformation of variables) the analytical properties, and
provides a computational example. Finally, Section 5 reviews the main conclusions
of this paper and illustrates directions for further research.
2 General model
Let us consider a taxpayer whose income evolves in time according to the stochastic
differential law
dwt = g(xt, wt)dt+ h(wt)dBt , (1)
with initial endowment w0 > 0. Bt is a Brownian motion, in a probability space
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(Ω,F , P ), with augmented natural filtration {Ft} (that is, {Ft} is obtained adding
the negligible events of F to the filtration generated by the Brownian motion).
Let us assume that 0 is the ‘time of expectations’ (or forecasts) and t ∈]0, T ] is the
‘time of choices’. The citizen in the infinitesimal time interval [t− dt, t] has income
wtdt and she is called to pay taxes at a rate θ, with 0 < θ < 1. If she declares
xt < wt (that is, xtdt represents the declared income in the infinitesimal interval
[t − dt, t]), she can be recognized as evader with (perceived) probability equal to p.
In such case, she has to pay a fine f > 1 on the evaded tax θ(wt− xt)dt, i.e. she has
to pay fθ(wt− xt)dt. Therefore, the citizen ends up with an effective income (in the
infinitesimal interval [t − dt, t]) equal to ytdt, with yt = wt − θxt in case she is not
discovered, and yt = wt − θxt − fθ(wt − xt) otherwise. Furthermore, the citizen has
its own ‘well-being function’ B of the form
B(y, x, θ, α) = U(y) + C(x, θ, α) ,
where y ∈]0,∞[ is the effective income, x ∈]0,∞[ is the declared income, α ∈]0, 1[
is a parameter of (perceived) effectiveness of public expenditure, the (real-valued)
functions U and C are, respectively, the classical utility of income and the ‘confidence’
(a utility of contributing to the collective welfare).
We consider the problem of a taxpayer who forecasts her compliance (the process xt)
in order to maximize the following functional
E0
(∫ T
0
F (wt, xt)dt
)
,
where E0() is the conditional expectation with respect to the initial endowment w0,
and F (wt, xt) is the expected well-being of the taxpayer, that is
F (wt, xt) = (1− p)U(wt − θxt) + pU(wt − θxt − fθ(wt − xt) ) + C(xt, θ, α) . (2)
The interpretation is that the taxpayer expects that in the time interval [0, T ] she
will declare a (stochastic) total income
XTot =
∫ T
0
xtdt, (3)
where xt (t ∈ [0, T ] ) denotes the optimal control process of the problem.
As in (Sparta`, 2016), the model describes the expectations of the taxpayer on the
part of income that she will declare in the future. However, in this paper we assume
that wt follows the stochastic differential law (1), namely, the income has a trend
driven by the function g and an uncertainty driven by the function h. Now, the
taxpayer’s compliance decision becomes truly dynamic, because the trend function
g depends on xt (that is, the choice at time t determines the trend of the income in
the future). For instance (as we can see in the sections 3 and 4) the function g can
express the effect of investments (public and private) on the income.
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For technical reasons, namely to avoid dealing with the utility of negative amounts,
we put a ceiling on the fine, assuming 0 < θ < 1
f
. This hypothesis is consistent
for example with tax systems characterized by frequent checks and fines not too
high. We assume that the utility functions U and C have continuous second order
derivatives with respect to all their arguments. We set C(0, θ, α) and Cx(0, θ, α)
as the limit (eventually not finite) respectively of C(x, θ, α) and Cx(x, θ, α), for x
that tends to 0 from the right. We assume that U is strictly increasing and strictly
concave, i.e. for all y
U ′(y) > 0 , U ′′(y) < 0 .
We assume similar hypothesis for the confidence C as a function of the declared
income, i.e. for all x, θ, α,
Cx(x, θ, α) ≥ 0 , Cxx(x, θ, α) ≤ 0 .
Moreover, we also assume that there exists θ ∈ [0, 1[ such that for θ > θ (and for all
x, α) we have
Cxθ(x, θ, α) ≤ 0 ,
namely, the marginal confidence of declared income is monotonically non-increasing
with respect to θ, at least above θ. This assumption seems reasonable because if
taxes are perceived as too high, citizens lose confidence in institutions and then they
are less motivated to give their fiscal contribution.
Furthermore, we assume that for all x, θ, α we have
Cxα(x, θ, α) ≥ 0 ,
that is, the marginal confidence of declared income is monotonically non-decreasing
with respect to α. Finally, we assume that the (real) functions g, h are measurable
(with respect to the real Borel σ-algebras).
We denote by A the set of admissible control processes defined as follows
A =

x(t, ω) : [0, T ]× Ω→ R such that :
1)xt(ω) ismeasurablewith respect toFt andB(R), for all t.
2)There exists aMarkov processw solution of (1),
pathwise unique and positive.
3) 0 ≤ xt ≤ wt (in [0, T ]× Ω).
4)E0
( ∫ T
0
F (wt, xt)dt
)
exists.

.
We remark that, since we are describing a general model, here we do not require any
conditions on the functions g and h in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness
of the solution of (1). Later on in Section 4.1, we present the analytical study of a
particular class of models, and there we refine the definition of the set of admissible
control processes.
The value function of the problem takes the form
5
V (wt, t) = sup
x∈A
Et
(∫ T
t
F (ws, xs)ds
)
(4)
(where Et() is the conditional expectation with respect to the initial value wt).
The HJB equation for the stochastic control problem (4) is
sup
x (with 0≤x≤w)
[
F (w, x) + Vw(w, t)g(x,w) +
1
2
Vww(w, t)(h(w))
2 + Vt(w, t)
]
= 0 ,
with the (terminal) condition at time T
V (w, T ) = 0 .
3 Solution of the paradox on risk neutrality
Let us consider the static and deterministic model in which, slightly weakening the
hypotheses on the utility U (in order to consider the linear case), we assume{
U(y1) = ky1 ,
C(y2, θ, α) = 0 ,
(5)
with k > 0. Namely, the taxpayer has linear utility (that describes risk neutrality).
Notice that, being the confidence identically zero, this case can also be seen as a
particular specification of the classical models of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and
Yitzhaki (1974) (weakening the hypotheses on U).
Let W be the gross income of the taxpayer. She has to decide how much income X
to report. The expected well-being takes the form (see (2) and (5))
F (W,X) = (1− p)k(W − θX) + pk(W − θX − fθ(W −X) ) .
In case pf = 1, the expected well-being becomes
F (W,X) = (1− θ)kW ,
i.e. it is independent of X. Therefore, in this case all the choices of declared income
X ∈ [0,W ] are equivalent for the taxpayer. Namely, there is a paradoxical situation
in which the taxpayer is indifferent with respect to her tax compliance.
In order to solve the paradox, we put the choice of the taxpayer in a dynamical
context considering the presence of public investments. Let us analyze the (deter-
ministic) control problem
sup
xt (with 0≤xt≤wt)
∫ 1
0
F (wt, xt)dt ,
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dwt = [m+ c ln(1 +
xt
wt
)]dt , (6)
where
F (wt, xt) = (1− p)k(wt − θxt) + pk(wt − θxt − fθ(wt − xt) ) = (1− θ)kwt ,
with c > 0, w0 > 0, m > −w0. This is a deterministic case (weakening the hypotheses
on U) of the general control model that we have described in Section 2. The function
c ln(1 + xt
wt
) in (6) represents the effect of public investments on the trend of income
(to be more precise, it is an indirect effect, expressing that the taxpayer is motivated
to declare her income by the (expected) positive effect of public investments). The
constant m expresses the other factors that drive the expected trend of the income.
It is easy to see that the solution of the problem is xt = wt, for all t ∈ [0, 1] (because
this choice of the control function xt maximizes the state function wt, and in this
case the expected well-being F is (strictly) increasing with respect to wt). The
economic interpretation is that now the compliance choices are not equivalent, but
the taxpayer reports her income in full because she takes into account the effect of
public investments.
We can also complete the analytical study of the problem, considering the value
function
V (wt, t) =
∫ 1
t
(1− p)k(ws − θws) + pk(ws − θws − fθ(ws − ws) )ds
=
∫ 1
t
k(1− θ)wsds . (7)
Plugging the optimal compliance rate xt = wt, for all t ∈ [0, 1] into the differential
equation (6), we find that wt = w0 + [m + c ln(2)]t, whose primitive function is
w0t+
m+c ln(2)
2
t2. Thus, after a little algebra, the value function (7) reads
V (wt, t) =k(1− θ)
[
w0 +
m+ c ln(2)
2
− w0t− m+ c ln(2)
2
t2
]
=k(1− θ)
[
wt(1− t) + m+ c ln(2)
2
(1− t)2
]
. (8)
It is easy to see that (8) is solution of the HJB equation
Vt(w, t) + Vw(w, t)[m+ c ln(2)] + k(1− θ)w = 0 ,
with the terminal condition
V (w, 1) = 0 .
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4 Models with investment coefficients and loga-
rithmic utilities
In this Section we specify the form of the utility functions of the general model
presented in Section 2 as well as the functions g and h in the income dynamic (1).
From now on, we assume {
U(y1) = a ln(y1) ,
C(y2, θ, α) = b
α
θ
ln(l + y2) ,
(9)
and {
g(xt, wt) = [m+ c1
xt
wt
+ c2
yt
wt
]wt ,
h(wt) = σwt ,
(10)
where
yt = (1− p)(wt − θxt) + p(wt − θxt − fθ(wt − xt) )
is the effective income (we assume for p, f , α, θ the same hypotheses of Section 2).
Plugging the assumption (9) into (2) the expected well-being becomes
F (wt, xt) = (1−p)a ln(wt−θxt)+pa ln(wt−θxt−fθ(wt−xt) )+bα
θ
ln(l+xt) . (11)
In this way, we have defined the class (varying the parameters a > 0, b ≥ 0, m,
c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, σ 6= 0, l > 0, w0 > 0) of stochastic control problems
sup
x∈A
E0
(∫ T
0
F (wt, xt)dt
)
, (12)
dwt =
[
m+ c1
xt
wt
+ c2
yt
wt
]
wtdt+ σwtdBt , (13)
with initial endowment w0 > 0.
Notice that the assumptions of Section 2, on U and C, are verified. The constant
l occurs in the confidence function for technical reasons. It can also be chosen very
small, for instance l = 10−6.
The functions c1
xt
wt
and c2
yt
wt
in (13) account for the effect respectively of public
and private investments on the trend of income. The former is an indirect effect,
expressing that the taxpayer is motivated to declare her income by the (expected)
positive effect of public investments. The latter effect is linked to the effective income
yt. We may indicate the weights c1, c2, respectively, as public and private investment
coefficients. The constant m expresses the other factors that drive the expected trend
of the income.
Notice that we have chosen the linear form for the investments, but our analysis
remains valid also for other functional forms (for instance, for the logarithmic form
c1 ln(1 +
xt
wt
), c2 ln(1 +
yt
wt
), which models decreasing marginal effectiveness of the
investments).
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4.1 Analysis of the (rewritten) models
In order to study the analytical properties of problem (12), in the following we rewrite
the model with investment coefficients by using a transformation of variables. In this
way we can bring back the problem to classical theorems of stochastic control. In
particular, we demonstrate that the HJB equation has a solution, unique in a space
of polynomial growth functions, and this solution, under suitable hypotheses, is equal
to the value function.
Let us consider the transformation of variables{
zt =
xt
wt
,
vt = ln(wt) .
(14)
The expected well-being (11) becomes
G(vt, zt) = F (e
vt , zte
vt)
= (1− p)a ln(evt − θztevt) + pa ln( evt − θztevt − fθ(evt − ztevt) ) + bα
θ
ln(l + zte
vt)
= (1− p)a[vt + ln(1− θzt)] + pa[vt + ln( 1− θzt − fθ(1− zt) )] + bα
θ
ln(l + zte
vt) .
Applying Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
dvt = d ln(wt) =
1
wt
[m+ c1
xt
wt
+ c2
yt
wt
]wtdt− 1
2
1
w2t
σ2w2t dt+
1
wt
σwtdBt
= [m+ c1zt + c2
yt
evt
− 1
2
σ2]dt+ σdBt , (15)
with
yt = (1− p)(evt − θztevt) + p( evt − θztevt − fθ(evt − ztevt) ) . (16)
Let us observe that we used Itoˆ’s formula without the hypotheses of Itoˆ’s lemma
(because the logarithmic function is defined only on positive numbers). But if a
process vt verifies the stochastic differential law (15), then e
vt verifies the law (13)
(thus, we can apply Itoˆ’s lemma to the exponential function).
By using the transformation of variables (14), therefore, the stochastic control prob-
lem (12) and the income dynamic (13) become respectively
sup
z∈A′
E0
(∫ T
0
G(vt, zt)dt
)
, (17)
and
dvt = [m+ c1zt + c2
yt
evt
− 1
2
σ2]dt+ σdBt , (18)
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where A′ is the set of the admissible controls, defined as
A′ =

z(t, ω) : [0, T ]× Ω→ R such that :
1) zt(ω) ismeasurablewith respect toFt andB(R), for all t.
2)There exists aMarkov process v solution of the stochastic
differential law, pathwise unique.
3) 0 ≤ zt ≤ 1 (in [0, T ]× Ω).
4)E0
( ∫ T
0
G(vt, zt)dt
)
exists.
5) z is progressively measurable.

(for technical reasons, now we require that the admissible controls are progressively
measurable).
The value function of the problem is
R(vt, t) = sup
z∈A′
Et
(∫ T
t
G(vs, zs)ds
)
, (19)
and the related HJB equation is
supz (with 0≤z≤1)
[
G(v, z) +Rv(v, t)[m+ c1z + c2
y
ev
− 1
2
σ2]
+1
2
Rvv(v, t)σ
2 +Rt(v, t)
]
= 0 ,
(20)
with terminal condition
R(v, T ) = 0 . (21)
The following theorem summarizes some important properties related to the HJB
equation and to the solution of the stochastic control problem (19).
Theorem 1.
1. There exists a solution R(v, t) of the HJB equation (20) (with terminal con-
dition (21)), unique in the space of functions C2,1(R× [0, T ]) ∩ Cp(R× [0, T ])
(Cp(R× [0, T ]) is the set of continuous functions φ on R× [0, T ], satisfying the
polynomial growth condition |φ(v, t)| ≤ k(1 + |v|h) for some constants k, h).
2. We have, for all v, t,
R(v, t) ≥ R(v, t)
(namely, the solution of the HJB equation is greater than or equal to the value
function). Furthermore, if there exists an admissible control process zt that (for
almost all (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω) maximizes
G(vt, z) +Rv(vt, t)[m+ c1z + c2
yt
evt
− 1
2
σ2] (22)
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(where vt is the solution of (18) corresponding to zt and with yt as in (16)),
then, for all v, t,
R(v, t) = R(v, t)
(namely, the solution of the HJB equation is equal to the value function) and
zt is an optimal control process.
Proof. In order to demonstrate the first part of the theorem, let us observe that
problem (19) verifies the hypotheses of Theorem 4.3 in Fleming and Soner (2006,
p. 163) (see also Theorem 6.2 in Fleming and Rishel, 1975, p. 169), which ensures
the existence of a solution to the HJB equation, with uniqueness in the space of
(polynomial growth) functions C2,1(R × [0, T ]) ∩ Cp(R × [0, T ]). In fact, the HJB
equation (20) is uniformly parabolic (because σ2 > 0), G, Gv have polynomial growth
(with respect to v and z), and the control processes have values in a compact set (
[0, 1] ).
The second part follows from a verification theorem (see Theorem 3.1 in Fleming
and Soner, 2006, p. 157).
Theorem 1 reduces the analysis of the optimal stochastic control problem (19) to
solve the HJB equation (20) and to find the process zt that maximizes (22). We
perform these task in the next Section. This will allow us to study the (stochastic)
total income XTot (see (3)) that the taxpayer expects to declare, given by
XTot =
∫ T
0
zte
vtdt ,
obtained inverting the transformation of variables (14), with vt solution of (18)
corresponding to zt.
4.2 Computational example
Here we aim at showing how the theoretical results presented in the previous Sec-
tion can be used to analyze the taxpayer compliance behavior. More precisely, we
numerically solve the stochastic control problem (17) and we perform a Monte Carlo
simulation in order to provide an estimate of the mean and the variance of XTot.
In order to do that we consider for example the following values of the parameters
of the (rewritten) model (for simplicity, in the case with null confidence)
p=0.15, f=1.8, θ = 0.45, w0 = 1, a=1, b=0,
m=0.2, c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.5, σ = 1, T=1.
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Through a suitable algorithm, the maximization problem in the HJB equation (20) is
solved and the value function (as a solution of the corresponding partial differential
equation, numerically solved) is estimated (see figure 1). Then 10× n random vari-
ables with standard normal distribution are simulated and n (discretized) paths of vt
(each consisting of 10 values in equally spaced times, from t = 0.1 to t = 1) are deter-
mined, together with the corresponding n paths of xt. For each path of xt the asso-
ciated value of XTot is computed through a numerical integration. Finally, by means
of a Monte Carlo method, the estimators M =
∑n
j=1XTotj
n
and S2 =
(
∑n
j=1X
2
Totj
)−nM2
n−1
respectively for the mean and the variance of XTot are calculated (see also examples
in (Sparta`, 2016)), together with an approximate confidence interval (at the level of
95%) I =
[
M − 1.96
√
S2
n
,M + 1.96
√
S2
n
]
(with the same procedure, higher-order
moments of XTot and the histogram of its distribution could be estimated).
Figure 1: The value function R(v, t).
Executing the algorithm with n = 104 simulations of paths, it was obtained
M = 0.182709 , S2 = 0.00541982 , I = [0.181266, 0.184152] .
Varying the parameters of the problem, the following tables were obtained.
Table 1 shows how the estimated mean M reacts to changes in the magnitude of
the public investment coefficient c1, for different values of the utility parameter a
(see (9) and (10)). We can observe that, increasing the coefficient c1, the (expected)
total declared income tends to increase as well (in both cases a = 1 and a = 1.5).
Therefore, if the effect of public investment on taxpayer income raises, then she is
more motivated to tax compliance.
12
c1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25
a
1 0.000 0.183 0.553 0.954 1.325
1.5 0.000 0.183 0.560 0.947 1.303
Table 1: Sensitivity of M with respect to a and c1.
f 1.6 1.7 1.8
p
0.14 0.030 0.072 0.146
0.15 0.045 0.097 0.183
0.16 0.063 0.125 0.224
Table 2: Sensitivity of M with respect to p and f .
In Tables 2 and 3 the values of the estimated mean M are reported, varying the
probability p of being discovered or the fine f , or the coefficient of private invest-
ment c2. Notice that an increase in the values of the enforcement parameters p or
f leads to an increase in the (expected) total declared income. On the other hand,
M tends to decrease as the coefficient c2 increases. Intuitively, the higher is c2, the
greater is the impact of the private investments on taxpayer’s income (cfr. (13)).
Thus, she reduces tax compliance to finance private investments.
Table 4 displays the values of the estimated mean M when σ and θ are varied. No-
tice that as the tax rate θ increases, the (expected) total declared income tends to
decrease, i.e. there is a positive relationship between evasion and the tax rate. Fur-
thermore, varying σ (cfr. (13)), the values of M seem to stay rather stable.
Finally, Table 5 shows how the values of the estimated variance S2 react to changes
in the values of σ, for different values of initial endowment w0. Notice that if the
constant σ increases, then the variance of the total declared income tends to increase
as well (in both cases w0 = 1 and w0 = e
1
2 ). These results suggest that changes
in the income uncertainty, while have little impact on the mean of M , make more
volatile the total declared income.
c2 0.25 0.5 0.75
p
0.14 0.237 0.146 0.064
0.15 0.274 0.183 0.097
0.16 0.315 0.224 0.136
Table 3: Sensitivity of M with respect to p and c2.
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θ 0.35 0.4 0.45
σ
1 0.290 0.189 0.183
1.5 0.289 0.190 0.184
2 0.290 0.191 0.183
Table 4: Sensitivity of M with respect to σ and θ.
σ 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2
w0
1 0.005 0.009 0.016 0.023 0.033
e
1
2 0.015 0.027 0.046 0.060 0.094
Table 5: Sensitivity of S2 with respect to w0 and σ.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we propose a general stochastic control model to analyze the compli-
ance behaviour of a taxpayer endowed with a stochastic income. We assume that
the income dynamic is driven by economic factors linked to declared income (like
public and private investments). As a particular case (weakening the hypotheses
on U), we consider a model that allows to solve a paradox in the taxpayer’s choice
with risk neutrality. Then we consider a class of models with public and private
investment coefficients, that we study in their analytical properties with a suitable
transformation of variables, offering also a computational example.
With regard to the methodological perspective, in this paper we aim to provide
a framework that allows to examine the taxpayer’s compliance. Therefore, in this
context we do not analyse economic data.
In a possible development, the parameters can be calibrated on real data, also in
order to check the effectiveness of the model results.
Another improvement would be the deepening of the mathematical properties of
the models (for instance, in the case of models with investment coefficients, the pos-
sibility of using constant relative risk aversion utilities, different from the logarithmic
function). Finally, it would be nice to use these models as part of general equilibrium
models.
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